

# Rail Infrastructure Access Charge Issues

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# What Is Infrastructure “Separation”?

## ◆ Stages of “separation”

- None. Fully integrated (one operator, one infrastructure provider)
- Tenant (minority) users. Infrastructure manager controls and provides the dominant operations, minority users pay as tenants. “Trackage rights,” non-competing use
- Full separation. All operators are separated from infrastructure provider.
- Open vs. controlled (**franchised**) access: **a separate question**

## ◆ Types of separation: accounting, holding and institutional

## ◆ Ownership (public, mixed, private)

# Structure and Ownership

## OWNERSHIP SPECTRUM


STRUCTURE SPECTRUM

		PUBLIC	MIXED	PRIVATE
INTEGRATED		China, India	Some Arg. Frt concessions, Mex City frt, GYSEV	Brazil Concessions (Frt and pax), Argentina pax and some frt concessions, 3 main JRs
DOMINANT/TENANT		Russia Pax, 3 island JRs	Amtrak, VIA, JR Frt	US/Canada/Mex frts
	Accounting	"EU"		
SEPARATED	Holding	DB, FS, PKP, RU	German concessions and companies	
	Institutional	SJ/BV/Gm, Railion DK & NL	Swedish concessions, ARTC	UK


True "separation"

# Variables to Manage

## COMPETITION



## STRUCTURE



## REGULATION


1. All fit together
2. Regulation is a referee, not a panacea

# Is “Separation” New and Untested?

(It depends)


- ◆ US/Canada since 1900+ (Amtrak and VIA since 1970s). (mostly tenant)
- ◆ Japan – 1987 (tenant)
- ◆ Sweden – 1987 (institutional, public)
- ◆ **UK** – 1995 (full institutional, privatized -- **study**)
- ◆ Australia – ARTC in 1997 (mixed)
- ◆ EU Order 91-440 (1991 to present). (Mostly accounting, some holding, some institutional)
- ◆ Red herring issue: safety. Valid issue: complexity, incentives and transaction costs. Possibly valid: “wheel/rail” interface

# US Rail System Map Today: Class I Railroads (BUT 60 to 25 to 7)



# Multiple Use US Tracks

(Excluding Amtrak)



# Access Charge Situations

- ◆ Mutual interest (negotiated, often reciprocal)
- ◆ Non-competing use (pax on frt line)
- ◆ Imposed against the will and interest of infrastructure provider (usually regulatory)
- ◆ Mental constructs of the separated provider
  - Who, me?
  - The “public utility” provider
  - Infrastructure as a **product to sell** (EU language)



# Background: Objectives (Why Do It?)

- ◆ Originally, common interest by railways
- ◆ Efficiency in rail sector (economies of density)
- ◆ Financial stability for infrastructure provision
- ◆ Clarifying government roles and costs
- ◆ Business focus of the parts (inc. infrastructure)
- ◆ Open up public/private roles
- ◆ Promote competition: intra-modal, international
- ◆ The Commission made us do it (EU railways) and now new EU candidates CEE (BG, Turkey, RO)

# Infrastructure Charges: Coverage

- ◆ Maintenance and renewals
- ◆ Train planning and operations
- ◆ Electric power (diesel fuel by operator)
- ◆ Congestion and scarcity (capacity)
- ◆ External (social) costs

# Infrastructure Charges: Broad Approaches

- ◆ Tenant cases, focus on variable cost, or on negotiated outcome
- ◆ Pure social marginal cost (theory)
  - maximizes economic efficiency, may not yield financial stability if gov't does not pay its share
- ◆ Marginal cost plus markup (MC+)
  - need to know (and rely on?) government contribution
  - objectives of the markups?
  - in principle, zero based
- ◆ Full cost minus government contribution (FC-)
  - same issues as MC+ (but MC is floor price)
  - allocates all costs: can conceal inefficiencies
- ◆ Major Issues
  - defining/calculating marginal costs
  - calculation of social costs
  - agreed and consistent definitions and data
  - mark-ups and knowing the elasticities of the users
- ◆ MC+ and FC- very similar issues: **the devil is in the mark-ups**

# Infrastructure Charge Structures

## ◆ Simple – variable with measures of use

- gt-km, nt-km, p-km, train-km, wagon-km, % revenue
- weighting factors (speed, axle load, equipment design, specific route, time of day, commodity, other)

## ◆ Two-part

- variable factors as above
- fixed part (capacity to be used, path reservation)
- discrimination: economic efficiency versus equity
- allocation (FC-) versus causality (MC+)

# Economic and Policy Issues

- ◆ Degree of separation
- ◆ Network complexity and intensity of traffic
- ◆ Mix of traffic and path allocation priorities
- ◆ Growth rates in traffic (need for new capacity)
- ◆ Number of operators
- ◆ Competition goals (intramodal, international)
- ◆ Freight, ICP, HSR and suburban passenger incentives and cross-subsidies
- ◆ Slot rigidity (schedule) versus market demands
- ◆ User price elasticities (esp. supported services)
- ◆ Political/affiliate incentives to discriminate

# Recommendations for Bank audience

- ◆ Start with market definition (frt, ICP, Sub'n/regional)
- ◆ Examine ALL models: separation often not appropriate: LAC, AFR. Asian models vary.
- ◆ Use competition **for** the market, not **in** the market where possible.
- ◆ Keep access charges as uncomplicated as possible (tenant models are easier)
- ◆ Access charges should at least cover MC (**inc** renewals): gap between charges and FC should be reliably funded. If not, stick to tenant models
- ◆ Access regimes can use mixed approaches by market: simple MC+ for freight, 2-part FC- for exclusive services, simple or 2-part MC+ for ICP depending on competition

# Access Charge Regimes for Types of Rail Users

	Pure SMC	MC+	FC-	FC Contract with Sponsor (if any)
<b>Suburban</b>				High requirement for scheduled slots, relatively low speed. Limited response to price signals, high public support
<b>HSR Franchise</b>			Use two-part tariff for operations on conventional lines.	Slots all scheduled, rigid quality requirements, number of competing operators limited
<b>ICP Conventional and HSR:</b>				
<i>With competition in the market</i>		High capacity requirements. Two-part contracts appropriate, but fixed component should be minimized.		
<i>Without competition (or with competition for the market)</i>			High capacity schedule requirements. Suitable for two-part contracts	
<b>Freight</b>	Low schedule and track quality requirements. High response to price signals. Use either SMC or MC+ simple tariff with minimum mark-ups. Markups(if any) for freight in domestic, import-export and transit traffic movement should be uniform.			

# Some Experience

- ◆ Tenant models in the US and Japan “work” partly because they don’t matter much
- ◆ UK approach has undergone significant (painful) change
- ◆ EU has a patchwork of regimes: creates “seams”
- ◆ Cost recovery objectives differ
- ◆ Wide range of charges, especially freight
- ◆ Network complexities and intensities vary
- ◆ Different balances Freight versus Passenger
- ◆ No single model available




# The Access Regime Patchwork

	Simple	Two-Part
MC+	A,CZ,DK,SF,NL, N(frnt),P,S,CH,UK(frnt), <b>US tenant, JR Frt, ARTC</b>	BG,F,RO, UK(pass)
FC-	D,LV,PL,SI,SK	EE,H,I,E


Note: Railtrack began as two-part, FC: now shifting toward MC+

# Percent of Variable Cost Recovered from Infrastructure Charges




# Network Complexity versus Intensity of Use

(train-km/km of line basis)




Note: Russia, US and China added manually and do not affect the regression line.

# Percent International Freight Traffic




# Tenancy vs. Separation

(Percent Passenger Traffic)




# Average Access Charges (€/Train-Km)



Cross-hatch indicates CEEC

# Average Freight Train Size (net tons):

## The Baltics are Different



RU=2000, US=2700, CHA=2500, IR=1800